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Deciding whether one probability distribution is more informative (in the sense of representing a
less indeterminate situation) than another one is typically done using well-established information
measures such as, e.g., the Shannon entropy or other dispersion indices. In contrast, the relative
speciﬁcity of possibility distributions is evaluated by means of fuzzy set inclusion. In this paper,
we propose a technique for comparing probability distributions from the point of view of their rel-
ative dispersion without resorting to a numerical index. A natural partial ordering in terms of rela-
tive ‘‘peakedness’’ of probability functions is proposed which is closely related to order-1 stochastic
dominance. There is also a close connection between this ordering on probability distributions and
the standard speciﬁcity ordering on possibility distributions that can be derived by means of a known
probability–possibility transformation. The paper proposes a direct proof showing that the (total)
preordering on probability measures deﬁned by probabilistic entropy reﬁnes the (partial) ordering
deﬁned by possibilistic speciﬁcity. This result, also valid for other dispersion indices, is discussed
against the background of related work in statistics, mathematics (inequalities on convex functions),
and the social sciences. Finally, an application of the possibilistic speciﬁcity ordering in the ﬁeld of
machine learning or, more speciﬁcally, the induction of decision forests is proposed.
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The principle of maximum entropy plays an important role in probability theory, espe-
cially in the case of incomplete probabilistic models (see e.g. [25]). It is instrumental in
selecting a probability distribution in agreement with the available constraints, preserving
as much indeterminateness as possible. Moreover, entropy faithfully accounts for existing
dependencies and only assumes independence where no justiﬁcation to the contrary can be
found [17,19]. There are axiomatic characterizations of the Shannon entropy function [28].
Paris [25] has strongly advocated the selection of the maximum entropy probability as
being a reasonable default choice under incomplete information. Entropy can also be
viewed as one of the many dispersion indices that one can ﬁnd in the literature (see [23]).
In possibility theory, ‘‘least commitment’’ information principles similar to entropy
exist (e.g. [10]): When a set of constraints delimits a family of possibility distributions,
the least committed choice is the minimally speciﬁc distribution. The underlying idea is
to consider any situation as being possible as long it is not explicitly ruled out by the con-
straints. This principle obviously suggests maximizing possibility degrees.
There also exists a natural partial information ordering between possibility distributions,
called the speciﬁcity relation. This ordering is based on fuzzy set inclusion: If a possibility
distribution p :W! [0, 1] is pointwisely dominated by another distribution p 0 :W! [0, 1],
i.e., p(w) 6 p 0(w) for all w 2W, the former is said to be more speciﬁc than the latter (and
strictly more speciﬁc if p(w) < p 0(w) for at least one w 2W). The natural measure of
non-speciﬁcity in agreement with this partial ordering is the sum of the possibility degrees
(also the scalar cardinality of the corresponding fuzzy set).1
Intuitively, there is a connection between ideas of probabilistic dispersion and possibi-
listic speciﬁcity: large dispersion and low speciﬁcity suggest distributions with wide sup-
ports. One may see some analogy between maximal entropy and minimal speciﬁcity
principles, especially in the light of the Laplace indiﬀerence principle: In the possibilistic
framework, the case of complete ignorance is adequately represented by the uniform dis-
tribution p  1 (all states w are completely possible). Likewise, if a unique probability
distribution must be picked, the aforementioned indiﬀerence principle suggests selecting
the uniform distribution p  jWj1. For these distributions, the Shannon entropy and
the additive possibilistic measure of non-speciﬁcity coincide with the Hartley entropy of
a set [15], that is, the logarithm of the number of elements in the set. These authors use
an additive index of possibilistic non-speciﬁcity that looks like Shannon entropy.
The temptation to relate speciﬁcity and entropy at a formal level is great. For instance,
Klir [18] suggested equating numerical entropy and (additive) non-speciﬁcity indices for
the purpose of transforming possibility distributions into probability distributions and
conversely. This is debatable, however, because the entropy scale and the speciﬁcity scale
are not commensurate. Maung [21] has tried to justify the principle of minimal speciﬁcity
by adapting Paris’ rationality axioms to the possibilistic setting.1 Of course, here we assume the domain W to be ﬁnite or at least countable. Otherwise, the sum must be
replaced by an integral.
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diﬀerence between the probability and possibility settings. In the uncertainty literature,
the comparison between probability distributions is often based on a type of entropy index
without reference to an underlying intuitive partial ordering, which would be directly
deﬁned between probability distributions reﬂecting their relative informativeness. There
are actually several entropy indices and dispersion indices (such as the Gini index) but
the partial ordering that decides if a probability measure is more informative than another
one is far less known. Yet, in information theory, authors such as Morales et al. [23], have
pointed out that any well-behaved information measure is Schur-concave and satisﬁes a
monotonicity condition with respect to a natural informativeness ordering between prob-
ability distributions. Also, there is an old paper by Birnbaum [1] suggesting such a qual-
itative comparison of probability functions on the real line in terms of what is called their
peakedness, independently of the notion of entropy. It basically consists of checking the
nestedness of conﬁdence intervals of various conﬁdence levels extracted from the probabil-
ity distribution. Of course, the nestedness property of conﬁdence intervals strongly sug-
gests a similarity between the relative peakedness of probability distributions and the
relative speciﬁcity of possibility distributions. On the other hand, the more peaked a prob-
ability distribution, the less spread out and, hence, the less indeterminate it is, and the
lower its entropy should be.
The aim of this paper is to establish a connection between possibilistic speciﬁcity and a
variant of the peakedness relation between probability distributions, known in mathemat-
ics, information theory, and the social sciences. This relation compares them in terms of
dispersion and is reﬁned by Shannon entropy, as well as many other information or dis-
persion indices. Checking the peakedness relation between two probability distributions
comes down to comparing, in terms of speciﬁcity, possibility distributions whose cuts
are optimal prediction intervals of the original probability distributions around their
mode. These possibility distributions are in fact the most speciﬁc transforms from proba-
bility to possibility, already proposed by Dubois and Prade [4], and Delgado and Moral [3]
in the eighties. The paper thus establishes a new link between possibility and probability
theories. The proposed qualitative comparison test between probability distributions may
arguably be considered as the natural information ordering between probability functions,
something which is not always known in the uncertainty literature. We show that this type
of ordering is akin to stochastic dominance. It also corresponds to a concept of majoriza-
tion, studied in the early XXth century by Hardy et al. [14], for comparing vectors of posi-
tive numbers having the same sum (and hence that cannot be compared component-wise),
and furthermore used in the social sciences for the comparison of social welfare of societies
of agents [24].
The next section introduces a generalized notion of cumulative distribution, and
describes the relative peakedness of probability functions in terms of stochastic dominance
with respect to a particular choice of cumulative distribution. The relation between possi-
bilistic speciﬁcity and probabilistic peakedness is shown, noticing that the chosen form of
cumulative distribution corresponds to a well-known type of probability–possibility trans-
formation. To make the paper self-contained, a direct proof, establishing the consistency
between the possibilistic speciﬁcity ordering and the probabilistic entropy measure, is
given in Section 3. A discussion of related work in the statistical, mathematical, and social
science literature is provided in Section 4. It enables the obtained results to be generalized
to a large class of dispersion indices. An application of the possibilistic speciﬁcity ordering
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proposed in Section 5.2. A notion of comparative dispersion: The peakedness ordering
When comparing probability distributions in terms of their informativeness (or dually
in terms of dispersion), it is clear that the more peaked a distribution, the more informa-
tive, the less dispersed it is. Probability distributions on ﬁnite sets can be viewed as vectors
the components of which sum to 1. Because of this property, it is diﬃcult to compare prob-
ability distributions pointwisely. Therefore, many authors resort to information indices
like Shannon entropy, or dispersion indices like the Gini index. The aim of this section
is to propose a notion similar to stochastic dominance that captures the notion of relative
peakedness of probability distributions, and to show its close relation to possibility theory,
where the pointwise comparison of possibility vectors is the natural way to go when com-
paring distributions in terms of speciﬁcity.2.1. Generalized cumulative distributions
Let Pr(Æ) be a probability measure on the real line with density p(Æ). The cumulative dis-
tribution of Pr(Æ) is denoted Fp(Æ) and deﬁned by Fp(x) = Pr((1,x]). When comparing ran-
dom variables X1 and X2 with cumulative distributions F1(Æ) and F2(Æ), respectively, it is
usual (for instance in economy) to use the notion of stochastic dominance: X1 stochastically
dominatesX2 if and only if F1 6 F2 (pointwisely). Stochastic dominance can be equivalently
deﬁned in terms of survival functions Sp(x) = Pr([x,+1)): X1 stochastically dominates X2 if
and only if S1P S2 (pointwisely). Strict dominance holds when S1P S2 and S1(x) > S2(x)
for at least one x. Dominance thus deﬁned is a natural approach to deciding whether one
random variable is larger than another one, since when X1 stochastically dominates X2, the
probability forX1 being larger than any threshold x is always larger than the corresponding
probability for X2.
Interestingly, the notion of cumulative distribution is based on the existence of the nat-
ural ordering of numbers. Consider a probability distribution deﬁned over a ﬁnite domain
W of cardinality n. In this case, no obvious notion of cumulative distribution exists, unless
W is endowed with a total preordering , that is, a reﬂexive, complete, and transitive
relation:
Deﬁnition 1. The -cumulative distribution of a probability distribution p(Æ) on a
ﬁnite, totally preordered set (W, ) is the function F p : W ! ½0; 1 deﬁned by F pðwÞ ¼
Prðfu 2 W : w  ugÞ.
Consider another probability distribution q(Æ) on W. The corresponding stochastic
-dominance relation between p(Æ) and q(Æ) can be deﬁned by the pointwise inequality
F p 6 F q. If the elements of W are numbered in such a way that wj  wi if and only if
i 6 j, then p(Æ) can be viewed as a probability distribution on {1,2, . . . ,n}, and F p coincides
with a genuine survival function of Pr(Æ) on {1,2, . . . ,n}. In other words, a generalized
cumulative distribution can always be considered as a simple one, up to a reordering of
elements. In the following, p(wi) is denoted pi for short.
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are more tightly clustered around the most frequent item(s) according to p(Æ) than around
the most frequent item(s) according to q(Æ). Consider -cumulative distributions of p(Æ)
and q(Æ), with respect to the orderings induced, respectively, by the probabilities pi and
qi: xi p xj iﬀ pi 6 pj and xi q xj iﬀ qi 6 qj. It is possible to use such generalized cumulative
distributions to decide whether a probability distribution p(Æ) is more peaked than another
one q(Æ). The idea is to deﬁne mappings from W to natural numbers {1,2, . . . , jWj} that
correspond to the above suggested re-orderings of elements from the most probable to
the least probable, and to use stochastic dominance on {1,2, . . . , j Wj} to compare p(Æ)
and q(Æ), the ‘‘largest’’ random variable on the integers corresponding to the most peaked
one on W.
Let a = O(p) be the ordered probability vector obtained from p(Æ) by rearranging the
probability degrees pi in a non-increasing order. That is,
a ¼ ða1; . . . ; anÞ ¼ ðprð1Þ; . . . ; prðnÞÞ;
where r is a permutation of {1, . . . ,n} such that pr(i)P pr(j) for i < j. Likewise, we denote
by b = (b1, . . . ,bn) = O(q) the ordered probability vector associated with q(Æ). Now, a and b
can be viewed as probability distributions over the set {1,2, . . . ,n}.
Obviously, F ppðxrðiÞÞ ¼ Prðfi . . . ngÞ ¼
Pn
k¼iak ¼ SaðiÞ, in terms of survival functions:
Deﬁnition 2. A probability distribution p(Æ) on W is said to be more peaked than a
probability distribution q(Æ) in the wide sense if and only if Sa(i) 6 Sb(i) for all i = 1, . . . ,n,
where a = O(p), b = O(q).
The meaning of this deﬁnition is that if a random variable X1 onW is more peaked than
X2, then for any integer i, the probability of picking a realization of X1 not among the i
most probable ones is less or equal to the probability of picking a realization of X2 not
among the i most probable ones. Hence, relative peakedness can be viewed as stochastic
dominance in the appropriate space.
Example 3. For the two probability distributions speciﬁed by the probability vectors
p ¼ ð:05 :20 :25 :25 :20 :05Þ;
q ¼ ð:30 :15 :05 :05 :15 :30Þ
(see Fig. 1 for a graphical illustration) we obtain1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Fig. 1. The probability distribution on the left is (strictly) less peaked than the one on the right.
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Sb ¼ ð1:0 :70 :40 :25 :10 :05Þ:
Since SaP Sb (and Sa(2) > Sb(2)), p(Æ) is (strictly) less peaked than q(Æ).2.2. Relative peakedness and possibilistic speciﬁcity
A possibility distribution p(Æ) is a mapping fromW to the unit interval such that p(w) = 1
for some w 2W. A possibility degree p(w) expresses the absence of surprise about w being
the actual state of the world. It generates a set function P(Æ) called a possibility measure
such that P(A) = maxw2Ap(w). The degree of necessity (certainty) of an event A is com-
puted from the degree of possibility of the complementary event Ac as N(A) = 1  P(Ac).
In the following deﬁnition, we recall a basic notion from possibility theory (e.g. [10])
already mentioned in the introduction.
Deﬁnition 4. We say that a possibility distribution p(Æ) is more specific than a possibility
distribution q(Æ) iff p 6 q pointwisely. It is strictly more speciﬁc if p 6 q and p(w) < q(w)
for at least one w 2W.
Clearly, the more speciﬁc p(Æ), the more informative it is. If p(wi) = 1 for some wi and
p(wj) = 0 for all j5 i, then p(Æ) is maximally speciﬁc (full knowledge); if p(wi) = 1 for all i,
then p(Æ) is minimally speciﬁc (complete ignorance).
A numerical degree of possibility can be viewed as an upper bound to a probability
degree [8]. Namely, with every possibility distribution p(Æ) one can associate a non-empty
family of probability measures dominated by the possibility measure
PðpÞ ¼ fPrðÞ j PrðAÞ 6 PðAÞ for all A  W g:
On such a basis, it is possible to change representation from possibility to probability and
conversely. Changing a probability distribution into a possibility distribution means losing
information as the variability expressed by a probability measure is changed into incom-
plete knowledge or imprecision. Some principles for this transformation have been sug-
gested in [9]. They come down to selecting a most speciﬁc element from the set of
possibility measures dominating Pr(Æ), that is,
8A  W : PðAÞP PrðAÞ
with P(A) = maxw2Ap(w) and PrðAÞ ¼
P
w2ApðwÞ. A minimal consistency between the
ordering induced by the probability distribution and the one of the possibility distribution,
p(w) > p(w 0) whenever p(w) > p(w 0), is also required.
Let p = T(p) be the possibility distribution derived from the probability distribution p(Æ)
according to the following probability–possibility transformation suggested by Dubois
and Prade [4]
pi ¼
Xn
j¼i
aj; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n; ð1Þ
where a = O(p) and pi is short for p(wr(i)). Obviously, 1 = p1P   P pn. Moreover, the
possibility measureP(Æ) associated with p(Æ) dominates the corresponding probability mea-
sure Pr(Æ).
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sures that dominate the probability function Pr(Æ) induced by the distribution p(Æ); see
Dubois and Prade [4], and Delgado and Moral [3]. Moreover, if the ordering induced
by p(Æ) on W is linear (i.e., ai5 aj for all i5 j) then T(p) is the unique maximally speciﬁc
possibility distribution which dominates Pr(Æ) and respects the ordering induced by the
probability assignment. When there are elements of equal probability, the uniqueness of
the maximally speciﬁc dominating possibility distribution can be recovered if the ordering
induced by p(Æ) onW is requested to be the same as the ordering induced by p (but then the
equation deﬁning T(p) must be adjusted accordingly). The transformation T is hence
called optimal.
It is patent that the possibility function T(p) coincides with the survival function Sa with
respect to the ordering induced by the probability values, as deﬁned in the previous
section.
In fact, any generalized cumulative (with respect to a weak order  on W) distribution
F p of a probability measure Pr(Æ) with distribution p(Æ) onW can be viewed as a possibility
distribution the associated measure of which dominates Pr(Æ), i.e., maxw2AF
p
ðwÞP
PrðAÞ; 8A  W . This property holds because a (generalized) cumulative distribution is
constructed by computing the probabilities of events Pr(A) in a nested sequence deﬁned
by the ordering relation.
Probability–possibility transformations have been extended to the real line by Dubois
et al. [9] (see also Dubois et al. [11]). Let p(Æ) be a unimodal continuous probability density
with mode m. Suppose one tries to represent this information by means of an interval I.
Intuitively, I must be narrow enough to be informative, and its probability must be high
enough to let I be credible. It can be proved that the most narrow prediction interval I
such that Pr(I)P k, where k is a ﬁxed conﬁdence level, is of the form Ik = {xjp(x)P h}
for some threshold h. Then, the most speciﬁc possibility transform (inducing the same
ordering as p(Æ) on the real line) is p = T(p) such that
8x 2 R : pðxÞ ¼ pðyÞ ¼ 1 Prð½x; yÞ;
where [x,y] = Ip(x). Clearly, p(m) = 1.
In this case, deﬁne an ordering relationPm on the real line such that xPm y if and only
if jm  xjP jy  mj; then p(x) = Sm(x) is the survival function of p(Æ) with respect to the
ordering Pm.
As a result of this subsection, the peakedness relation for the comparison of probability
functions can be described in terms of the relative speciﬁcity of their optimal probability
transforms.
Deﬁnition 5. Let p = T(p) be the transformation (1) of an ordered probability vector a,
i.e., pi ¼
Pn
j¼iaj. We say that a probability distribution p(Æ) on a ﬁnite setW is more peaked
than a distribution q(Æ) on W iff pi 6 qi for all 1 6 i 6 n, where p = T(O(p)) and q =
T(O(q)). We say that p(Æ) is strictly more peaked than q(Æ) if it is more peaked and pi < qi
for at least one index i 2 {1, . . . ,n}.
In the previous numerical example 1, p = Sa and q = Sb, and p(Æ) is (strictly) less peaked
than q(Æ) because p(Æ) is (strictly) less speciﬁc than q(Æ).
Subsequently, the peakedness relation is understood in the sense of this deﬁnition. The
‘‘less peaked than’’ relation is obviously invariant under permutations of the involved
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ity vectors in the next section.
3. From peakedness to dispersion indices
The aim of this section is to prove that the peakedness relation, which is expressed in
terms of possibilistic speciﬁcity, is consistent with the ordering of probability distributions
induced by Shannon entropy and many other dispersion indices. As will be seen in the next
section, this result is not completely new, and related results already exist in mathematics
and some other ﬁelds outside the uncertainty community. However, to make the paper
self-contained, we provide an explicit direct (and to the best of our knowledge novel) proof.
3.1. The main result
The most popular probabilistic information index is entropy.
Deﬁnition 6. The entropy of a probability distribution p(Æ) is deﬁned by
EðpÞ ¼ 
Xn
j¼1
pj  log pj: ð2Þ
In the following, we consider a generalized form of entropy deﬁned by:
D/ðpÞ ¼
Xn
j¼1
/ðpjÞ; ð3Þ
where the function x# /(x) is strictly concave on (0,1). (Note that, in particular, the
function x# x log(x) is strictly concave on (0,1): its second derivative is given by
x# 1/x.) The family (3) covers many dispersions indices, for instance the Renyi family
DkðpÞ ¼
Pn
j¼1ðpjÞk  1
21k  1 :
This is a concave function with limk!1Dk(p) = E(p). The quadratic case (k = 2) is often
considered. Besides, limk!0Dk(p) = j{ijpi > 0}j  1, the latter being the size of the support
of p(Æ).
The main result of this paper claims that the ordering induced by D/ function (hence
entropy in particular) reﬁnes the peakedness relation:
Theorem 7. If a probability vector a is less peaked than a vector b, then D/(a)P D/(b); if a
is strictly less peaked than b, then D/(a) > D/(b).
Below, we shall prove this theorem in the following way: We construct a sequence of
probability vectors a0,a1, . . . ,am such that a0 = a, am = b and ak+1 is more (resp. strictly
more) peaked than ak. Moreover, this sequence will satisfy D/(a
k)P D/(a
k+1) (resp.
D/(a
k) > D/(a
k+1)) for all 1 6 k 6 m  1.
Remark 8. Simple counter examples can be constructed showing that an implication in the
other direction, for instance that E(a)P E(b) implies a to be less peaked than b, does not
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total preorder on the class of probability measures, whereas the peakedness relation
deﬁnes only a partial ordering. In other words, the former ordering is a proper reﬁnement
of the latter one.
Other interesting indices ﬁtting the framework are the Bayes probability of error,
e(p) = 1  maxi pi, and the Gini index
GðpÞ ¼
Xn
i;j¼1
minðpi; pjÞ  1:
Interestingly, this information index is closely related to the following probability–possi-
bility transform [5]:
p^i ¼
Xn
j¼1
minðpi; pjÞ;
since G(p)  1 is equal to its amount of imprecision Pnj¼1p^j. It is easy to show that it can
also be written in terms of the imprecision of the optimal probability–possibility transform
(1) since GðpÞ ¼ 2Pnj¼1pj as well. So, the above theorem trivially holds for the Gini index.
It holds in the wide sense for e(p). Other information indices can be found in [23].
3.2. Auxiliary result
Let a and b denote two (ordered) probability vectors such that a is strictly less peaked
than b. Starting with a0 = a, a distribution ak+1 will be obtained from a distribution ak by
shifting a part of the probability mass akj to a
k
i for appropriately deﬁned indices j > i. More
generally, a shifting operation S(a, i, j,c) will transform an ordered vector a = (a1 . . .ai . . .
aj . . .an) into the ordered vector
ac ¼ ða1 . . . ai þ c . . . aj  c . . . anÞ:
Note that if p = T(a) and pc = T(ac) denote, respectively, the possibilistic transforms of a
and ac, then
pck ¼
pk if k 6 i;
pk if j < k;
pk  c if i < k 6 j:
8><
>: ð4Þ
Thus, pc 6 p does obviously hold true, and ac is strictly more peaked than a in the case
where c > 0.
To guarantee a shifting operation S(a, i, j,c) to be valid in the scope of turning a into b,
the choice of c must satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Proper ordering : ai1P ai + c and aj  cP aj+1,
(ii) Limited increase of speciﬁcity: pcP q = T(b).
Recalling (4), the latter item means that
pck ¼
Xn
i¼k
ai  cP
Xn
i¼k
bi ¼ qk
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m¼kdm P 0 for all 1 6 k 6 n. The condition pcP q can thus be written as
8i < k 6 j : c 6
Xn
m¼k
dm:
To satisfy both (i) and (ii), we hence need
c 6 min min
i<k6j
Xn
m¼k
dm; ai1  ai; aj  ajþ1
 !
: ð5Þ
Since a5 b, there exists j = max{kjak5 bk}. Of course, aj > bj since pP q. By deﬁnition,
we also have dj = aj  bj = pj  qj. Since a and b are probability distributions, there must
be some i < j such that bi > ai. So, let
i ¼ maxfkj1 < k 6 n; bk > ak and ak1 > akg ð6Þ
if the set on the right-hand side is not empty (as will be assumed for the time being).
In order to simplify the upper bound on the number c, we ﬁrst derive a lower bound on
the quantity mini<k6j
Pn
m¼kdm that appears as the ﬁrst argument on the right-hand side of (5).
Lemma 9. mini<k6j
Pn
m¼kdm P minfaj  bj; bi  aig for all i < j.Proof. Deﬁne DðkÞ ¼Pnm¼kdm and D = mini< k6jD(k). We consider two cases:
(a) D = D(j). In this case, the lemma obviously holds, since dm = am  bm = 0 for m > j
and hence D(j) = aj  bj.
(b) D < D(j). In this case, there must be an index k0 with i < k0 < j and such that
D(k0) < D(k0 + 1). We claim thatDðiþ 1Þ < Dðiþ 2Þ <    < Dðk0Þ: ð7Þ
In fact, since D(k0) < D(k0 + 1) we have ak0 < bk0 . Thus, either i = k0  1 (in which case (7)
does trivially hold), or ak01 ¼ ak0 (since if ak01 > ak0 and ak0 < bk0 , the index k0 is a po-
tential candidate for the choice of i). In the latter case, ak01 ¼ ak0 < bk0 6 bk01 and
therefore
Dðk0  1Þ ¼ Dðk0Þ þ ðak01  bk01Þ < Dðk0Þ:
This argument can be repeated, showing that (7) does indeed hold. This in turn shows that
D = D(i + 1). Moreover, we then have
D ¼ Dðiþ 1Þ ¼ DðiÞ  ðai  biÞ ¼ DðiÞ þ ðbi  aiÞP bi  ai;
since D(i)P 0.
Overall, we get DP aj  bj in case (a) and DP bi  ai in case (b). Thus, the lemma
does indeed hold. h
Now, if we let
c ¼ minðaj  bj; bi  ai; ai1  aiÞ ð8Þ
then the above results and the fact that
aj  ajþ1 ¼ ðaj  bjÞ þ ðbj  ajþ1ÞP ðaj  bjÞ þ ðbjþ1  ajþ1Þ ¼ ðaj  bjÞ
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ai > 0, aj  bj > 0, bi  ai > 0 by construction.
Let us now turn to the case where the right-hand side of (6) is empty.
Lemma 10. Suppose that a is less peaked than b, and that the right-hand side on (6) is empty.
Then b1 > a1.Proof. Suppose that a is less peaked than b. There is some k < j such that bk > ak. Since the
right-hand side on (6) is empty, it holds that bu > au implies au = au1 for all u < j. More-
over, since bk > ak, this implies in turn bk1P bk > ak1. The fact that b1 > a1 follows
immediately by repeating this argument. h
Regarding the choice of c in the case of an empty right-hand side in (6), the only dif-
ference concerns the condition aci1 P a
c
i which simply becomes unnecessary. Hence, one
can deﬁne
c ¼ minðaj  bj; b1  a1Þ ð9Þ
and apply the shifting operation S(a, 1, j,c) in the same way as before.
3.3. Proof of the main result
Obviously, if the quantity c as deﬁned in (8) (resp. (9)) is shifted from position j to posi-
tion i (resp. position 1), then either acj ¼ bj or aci ¼ bi or aci ¼ ai1. In any case, at least one
of the indices i or j will have a smaller value in the next iteration. Hence, the process of
repeating the shifting operation, with i, j, and c as speciﬁed above, is well-deﬁned, admis-
sible and turns a into b in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Given the above results, Theorem 7 follows immediately from the next lemma (recall
that in each step of our iterative procedure, the constant c shifted from index j to index
i is strictly positive):
Lemma 11. Let D/ðaÞ ¼
Pn
j¼1/ðajÞ where / is strictly concave. Then D/(a) > D/(ac) for
c > 0.Proof. It is easy to see that D/(a) > D/(a
c) is equivalent to
/ðai þ cÞ þ /ðaj  cÞ < /ðajÞ þ /ðajÞ:
Noting that ai > aj, this inequality holds because, by deﬁnition, the function x# /(x) is
strictly concave on (0,1). h
The above results show that the peakedness ordering proposed here underlies many
probabilistic information indices, which turn out to be in agreement with possibilistic spec-
iﬁcity. Theorem 7 is in particular valid for the standard Shannon entropy, and the loga-
rithm log(Æ) in (2) can be replaced by any monotone increasing function F(Æ) the second
derivative F00(Æ) of which exists on (0,1) and satisﬁes F00(x)/F 0(x) > 2/x for all 0 < x < 1
(where F 0(Æ) denotes the ﬁrst derivative). In fact, one might thus be tempted to require
the property of coherence with the possibilistic speciﬁcity as a minimal prerequisite for
any probabilistic measure of dispersion. That is, any index of dispersion D should satisfy
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q = T(O(q)); if pP q then D(p)P D(q). Additional properties can then be required for
selecting a particular dispersion index.4. Related work
The above results are in some sense not completely new. This section surveys three areas
where closely related results or ideas can be found. First, we give a precise account of old
mathematical results around a notion of majorization, which is a generalization of peaked-
ness to any vector of positive real values. Then, we note the presence of similar concerns in
statistics, that originally inspired our work. Finally, we point out the application of maj-
orization in the social sciences.
4.1. Mathematics
The well-known book by Hardy et al. [14]2 contains technical results that are equivalent
to the main results of this paper. In Section 2.18 of the book, the authors are interested in
comparing vectors of values, the sum of components of which are equal (for instance prob-
ability assignments). Suppose a and b are two vectors of values arranged in decreasing
order (a1P a2P   P an), and whose sums of components are equal. They say that a
is majorized by b if and only if
Pj
i¼1ai 6
Pj
i¼1bi; 8j ¼ 1; . . . ; n, which is equivalent toPn
i¼jai P
Pn
i¼jbi due to the equality
Pn
i¼1ai ¼
Pn
i¼1bi. Thus, the majorization of a by b
exactly coincides with the fact that b is more peaked than a.
The question motivating the majorization relation is that of comparing expressions
called symmetric means, which consist of the average of n! terms of the formQn
j¼1u
ai
i ðui > 0; ai P 0Þ; the latter are obtained by the possible permutations of the coeﬃ-
cients ui. As such a symmetric mean is stable under permutations of the a0is, comparing sym-
metric means, denoted [a], having diﬀerent a exponents comes down to comparing the
arranged vectors a. Hardy et al. prove that [a] 6 [b] as soon as a is majorized by b, the
equality holding only when [a] = [b] or the coeﬃcients ui are equal. Interestingly, the result
is proved using an elementary transfer notion of the form used above in Section 3.2.
The authors then go on proving another result providing a necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition for a to be majorized by b. Namely, they notice that this is equivalent to any com-
ponent of a being a certain form of weighted average of the components of b. Namely,
there exists a non-negative n · n weight matrix M such that the sum of elements in each
row and each column is 1 (a so-called bistochastic matrix), and a is majorized by b if
and only if a =Mb. A function D(p) mapping probability distributions to reals is said
to be Schur-concave if D(Mb)P D(b) for all bistochastic matrices M, see [23] for details
and references.
In Section 3.17 of the book, Hardy et al. prove a strong form of Theorem 7, namely thatPn
j¼1/ðajÞ 6
Pn
j¼1/ðbjÞ holds for all continuous and convex functions / if and only if a is
majorized by b. To prove the result they show that the majorization relation can be induced
by a suitable choice of the function /, and the converse becomes obvious using the2 A more modern text on majorization is the one of Marshall and Olkin [20].
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of values is less than the weighted average of the images of the values (Schur concavity).
Moreover, in the case when / has positive second derivative everywhere, thenPn
j¼1/ðajÞ ¼
Pn
j¼1/ðbjÞ only when the sets of coeﬃcients in a and b are the same.
Our proof in the previous section is self-contained as it relates peakedness and disper-
sion indices in a direct way. The result of Hardy et al. indicates that the peakedness rela-
tion is the intersection of all total order relations induced by all dispersion indices of the
form D/ for a concave / function.
4.2. Statistics
The term ‘‘peakedness’’ was coined by Birnbaum. In a paper in 1948 [1], he dealt with
what he called the quality of a probability distribution, referring to its peakedness. Con-
sidering that the fourth moment of a distribution is not an appropriate measure of peaked-
ness, he proposed a deﬁnition of the relative peakedness of distributions as follows:
Deﬁnition 12. Let Y1 and Y2 be real random variables, associated with respective
probability spaces ðX1;A1;Pr1Þ, ðX2;A2;Pr2Þ, and y1 and y2 real constants. Y1 is said to
be more peaked about y1 than Y2 about y2 if and only if
Pr1ðj Y  y1 jP tÞ 6 Pr2ðj Z  z1 jP tÞ
holds for all tP 0.
It is clear that the function
pyðy1  tÞ ¼ pyðy1 þ tÞ ¼ Prðjx y1jP tÞ ¼ 1 Prð½y1  t; y1 þ tÞ
is a possibility distribution, and easy to show that for any choice of y1, its possibility mea-
sure dominates Pr(Æ); see Dubois et al. [11]. In this paper, we adapted this deﬁnition in two
ways: First, the results on the probability–possibility transforms clearly indicate that for
unimodal densities, choosing y1 as the mode of the distribution is reasonable. Moreover,
Birnbaum [1] considers intervals whose common midpoint is y1, yielding a symmetric pos-
sibility distribution even if the density is not symmetric by itself. Instead of intervals of the
form [y1  t,y1 + t], we used intervals of the form {xjp(x)P h}, since they lead to a pos-
sibility distribution of the same shape as the probability density (and peakedness refers to
the shape of this density anyway). The reason for this choice is that the width of intervals
with a ﬁxed conﬁdence level is thus minimized. This change of deﬁnition enables peaked-
ness to be deﬁned for any referential set, not just the reals. Indeed, the set {xjp(x)P h}
makes sense in general, if measurability is ensured, while [y1  t,y1 + t] assumes the real
line as an underlying domain. Here, we nevertheless restricted ourselves to the case of a
ﬁnite referential set, because entropy indices are usually applied to such domains.
Now, for p = T(a) it is clear that pi = 1  Pr({xjPr({x})P h}) if ai1P h > ai, which
recovers our variant of the original peakedness relation due to Birnbaum.
4.3. Social sciences
Even though the proposed notion of relative informativeness, based on possibilistic
speciﬁcity and Birnbaum peakedness, seems to be relatively unknown in the uncertainty
literature, there is a subﬁeld of the social sciences where the results obtained by Hardy
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welfare orderings, and in particular, the modeling of social inequalities.3
We refer to the book by Moulin [24]. In this framework, W is a set of agents, whose
welfare under some life conditions is measured by a utility function over W. The problem
is to compare the quality of utility vectors (u1, . . . ,un) from the standpoint of social wel-
fare. Under an egalitarian program of redistribution from the rich to the poor, the so-
called Pigou–Dalton principle of transfer states that transferring some utility from one
agent to an other one so as to reduce inequalities of utility values improves the social wel-
fare of the population.
Formally, the transformation of a vector a into a vector ac as in Section 3.2 is known as
a Pigou–Dalton transfer. The sequence of transformations we propose here is also used in
this literature. Moreover, the role of entropy is played by so-called inequality indices. The
counterpart to the possibility transform of a probability vector is called the Lorentz curve
of the utility vector, and the counterpart of the peakedness ordering is called the Lorentz
dominance relation.
One diﬀerence is that utility vectors do not sum to 1. But Lorentz dominance is pre-
cisely making sense for the comparison of utility vectors with equal sum. In this literature,
dispersion indices are called inequality indices, and those of the form D/ are called Atkin-
son indices.
Note that it would not be the ﬁrst time that possibility–probability transformations ﬁnd
counterparts in the social sciences. For instance, a transformation from a belief function to
a probability measure (obtained by generalizing the Laplace indiﬀerence principle) intro-
duced in [4] and called pignistic transformation by Smets [29] is known in the social sciences
as the Shapley value of cooperative games (see again Moulin [24]).5. An application in machine learning
The entropy measure and related dispersion criteria are used in many research areas for
diverse purposes. Since our results in previous sections have shown that the peakedness
relation for probability distributions and, hence, the associated speciﬁcity ordering for
possibility distributions is in agreement with entropy, the former could in principle be used
as an alternative to the latter, at least if the potential incomparability between distribu-
tions is tolerated. In fact, recall that the entropy measure induces a total preorder on
the set of probability distributions over a set X, whereas peakedness only provides a par-
tial order. On the other hand, while the latter seems to be a natural ordering in many
applications, its reﬁnement by means of the entropy measure is often done just because
entropy is better known than other dispersion indices. To make this point concrete, the
current section gives an example of the applicability of the peakedness relation as an alter-
native to the entropy measure in the ﬁeld of machine learning.5.1. Information measures in decision tree induction
A standard problem in supervised machine learning is to induce a classiﬁcation function
X! Y from a set of training examples ðxi; yiÞ 2 XY, where Y ¼ fy1; . . . ; ykg is a ﬁnite3 The authors are grateful to Je´roˆme Lang for pointing out this connection.
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ture vector of ﬁxed length, i.e., the input space X is the Cartesian product of the domains
of a ﬁxed set of attributes (features); subsequently, we make the simplifying assumption
that all these domains are ﬁnite.
The key idea of decision tree induction [26], by now one of the most popular machine
learning methods, is to partition a set of training examples in a recursive manner, thereby
producing a partitioning of the input space into decision regions that can be represented in
terms of a tree structure. In the simplest case, partitioning is accomplished through (univar-
iate) tests of the form [F(x) = fj], j = 1, . . . ,m, where F is a feature with domain {f1, . . . , fm}
and F(x) denotes the attribute value of the instance x. Each inner node of a decision tree is
associated with a test of that kind and, hence, splits a subset of examples according to the
value of the attribute F.
The generalization performance of a classiﬁcation function in the form of a decision
tree strongly depends on the selection of appropriate splitting attributes. Roughly speak-
ing, all common learning algorithms seek to induce a ‘‘simple’’ tree, since the generaliza-
tion performance of simple models is supposedly superior to that of complicated models.4
To make a selection at an inner node of a tree, each candidate attribute F is typically eval-
uated in terms of the information gain
EðY Þ  EðY jF Þ; ð10Þ
where
EðY Þ ¼ 
Xk
i¼1
pðyiÞ  log pðyiÞ;
EðY jF Þ ¼ 
Xm
j¼1
pðfjÞ
Xk
i¼1
pðyijfjÞ  log pðyijfjÞ:
Here, {f1, . . . , fm} is the domain of attribute F, and E(Y) is the Shannon entropy of the
class distribution (p(y1), . . . ,p(yk)) in the current example set (i.e., p(yi) denotes the relative
frequency of class label yi among current examples). Moreover, E(YjF) is the conditional
entropy of Y given F, namely a weighted average of the entropies of the class distributions
in the subsets of examples that are produced by splitting according to the values of F. In
probability theory, (10) is also known as the mutual information, i.e., the relative entropy
between the joint distribution (of Y and F) and the product of the marginals. Despite this
apparent theoretical justiﬁcation, it is worth mentioning that selecting splitting attributes
with maximal information gain is merely a heuristic approach which does not guarantee to
produce a tree of minimal size.5
In the best case, an attribute splits a set of examples into ‘‘pure’’ subsets, i.e., subsets in
which all examples do have the same class label; since a pure set of examples does not
necessitate further splits, it deﬁnes a leaf of the decision tree that can reliably be labeled
by the corresponding class.6 As opposed to this, the worst situation is an example set with
a uniform distribution over Y, since this distribution does not suggest any particular4 This is the principle of Occam’s razor.
5 Besides, information gain in its basic form suﬀers from other problems such as, e.g., a systematic preference
for attributes with many values.
6 To prevent overﬁtting the data, splitting is usually stopped earlier.
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mation gain) measure. One might argue, however, that the interpolation between them,
even if being based on the theoretically sound concept of mutual information, remains
arbitrary to some extent. In fact, from a classiﬁcation point of view, it is not obvious
why a class distribution like p = (0.5,0.5, 0,0) should be preferred to q = (0.7,0.1,
0.1, 0.1). More speciﬁcally, there is no obvious reason to expect the former to become
‘‘pure’’ (by further splitting) before the latter. And indeed, experimental studies [22] have
shown that using entropy in (10) is neither superior nor inferior to using alternative infor-
mation measures such as, e.g., the Gini index.
In contrast, the peakedness relation can well be motivated from a classiﬁcation point of
view. Roughly speaking, if a distribution p = (p1, . . . ,pk) over the class labels Y is more
peaked than a distribution q, then classifying on the basis of p is easier or better than clas-
sifying on the basis of q. For example, since p1P q1 (suppose that the distributions have
already been reordered such that p1P p2P   P pk), the probability to guess the class
label of a query instance x0 2 X correctly is higher for p than for q. More generally, sup-
pose that a prediction in terms of a credible set7 of labels C  Y is desired. Such a predic-
tion should reasonably consist of the k 0 6 k classes with highest probability, and since
Xk0
i¼1
pi P
Xk0
i¼1
qi
for all k 0 = 1, . . . ,k, the credible sets derived from p have higher conﬁdence than those de-
rived from q, regardless of the size k 0.
For the same reason, better performance is achieved in an alternative prediction sce-
nario where, instead of estimating the class label of the query instance only once, this label
must be guessed repeatedly until the true label is found [16]: the expected number of futile
trials is then smaller for p than for q.5.2. Lazy decision tree learning
A lazy variant of decision tree learning has been introduced in [13]. This variant gener-
ates a separate classiﬁcation tree for each query instance x0. More speciﬁcally, it only gen-
erates one branch of the tree, namely the one which is needed to classify x0. The test
predicates along this branch are particularly tailored to the query: the splitting criterion
(10) obviously seeks to maximize the information gain on average: E(YjF) is a weighted
average of the form
Xm
j¼1
pðfjÞEðY jfjÞ; ð11Þ
where the weights p(fj) are the (estimated) probabilities to encounter an instance x with
F(x) = fj. This strategy, however, is not reasonable if the instance to be classiﬁed is already
known in advance. In other words, given that the attribute value F(x0) of the query is
known, the entropy of the class distribution in those subsets of examples with a diﬀerent
value fj5 F(x0) is actually irrelevant. Correspondingly, instead of averaging the entropy7 This term is used in Bayesian statistics.
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from the current set of examples to the subset of examples x‘ with attribute value F(x‘) =
F(x0)
EðY Þ  EðY jF ðx0ÞÞ ¼
Xk
i¼1
pF ðyiÞ  log pF ðyiÞ 
Xk
i¼1
pðyiÞ  log pðyiÞ; ð12Þ
where pF(yi) is the probability (relative frequency) of the class yi in the subset of examples
with attribute value F(x0).
8
The lazy variant of decision tree induction, as lazy learning methods in general, is of
course more costly from a computational point of view, since a new model must be gen-
erated for each query instance. On the other hand, it often outperforms standard decision
tree learning in terms of predictive performance. For details of the method as well as
experimental results we refer to [13].5.3. Ensembles of decision trees
A so-called decision forest is a special type of ensemble learning technique. Here, the key
idea is to generate a whole set of models instead of only a single one. Viewing each of these
models as a member of a committee, predictions are then made by means of majority vot-
ing: given a new query, each model makes a vote in favor of a particular class, and the
class with the maximal number of votes is predicted.9 Under certain conditions, ensemble
methods can reduce both the bias and the variance of predictions. Roughly speaking, if
each individual model is suﬃciently accurate and, at the same time, the ensemble is diverse
enough, it is likely that incorrect predictions will ‘‘average out’’.
To generate a diverse ensemble of decision trees (from the same training data), diﬀerent
methods are conceivable. The key idea of random forests [2] is to modify deterministic deci-
sion tree induction as follows: At each inner node of the tree, the attribute with maximal
information gain is selected, not among all potentially available attributes, but only
among a randomly chosen candidate subset of ﬁxed size K.
Interestingly enough, our speciﬁcity ordering suggests an alternative way to generate
random forests: Instead of selecting a random subset of attributes ﬁrst and choosing the
best among these attributes afterwards, one could proceed the other way round: First
the most promising candidates are selected, namely those attributes that are optimal with
respect to the speciﬁcity ordering, and then one among these candidates is chosen at ran-
dom. As a potential advantage of this latter approach note that it does not assume the
speciﬁcation of the parameter K. Roughly speaking, instead of determining the size of
the candidate set in a more or less arbitrary way, it is dynamically adapted in accordance
with the ambiguity of the speciﬁcity ordering.
For such alternative random forests (ARF) we have implemented both a standard and a
lazy variant. In the lazy version, given a query instance x0 and a subset of training exam-
ples, the probability distribution pF(Æ) in (12) is derived for each potential feature F. An8 For technical reasons, the examples in the parent node are ﬁrst re-weighted such that all classes are equi-
probable; see [13] for details.
9 Unsurprisingly, a large number of alternatives to and reﬁnements of this simple aggregation procedure do
exist.
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attribute F 0, i.e., if there is no F 0 such that pF 0 ðÞ is (strictly) more peaked than pF. Finally,
one among these candidate attributes is chosen at random, and the example set is split
according to this attribute (viz. reduced to those examples having the same value as the
query). Recursive partitioning thus produces a branch whose leaf node classiﬁes the query
x0; the corresponding prediction is given by the majority of class labels in the leaf.
10 By
repeating this process a certain number of times, an ensemble of decision branches is pro-
duced, and the overall classiﬁcation is made by majority voting.
While the attribute selection in the lazy version only considers the peakedness of the
distribution in one subset of examples, namely the one with the same attribute value as
the query, the regular version (to induce standard trees) has to use a counterpart to the
weighted average (11). A relatively straightforward solution is to associate with an attri-
bute F the following distribution:
Xm
j¼1
pðfjÞ  pj;
where {f1, . . . , fm} is the domain of F and pj ¼ ðpj1 . . . pjkÞ is the distribution of the class la-
bels in the subset of examples with attribute value fj; more precisely, p
j is the distribution
after reordering, i.e., pj1 P p
j
2 P   P pjk.5.4. Experimental results
The main purpose of the experimental studies was to compare the random forest (RF)
method with the alternative (ARF) outlined above, both in the case of regular (‘‘eager’’)
and lazy learning. Further, we compared the ensemble methods with the corresponding
base learners, i.e., lazy and regular decision tree learning (LazyDT and DT). All methods
have been implemented under the WEKA framework [31]. Since RF is already available,
we only implemented the lazy variant LazyRF (the main diﬀerence again concerns the
splitting measure, which in this case is (12)). As a decision tree learner we used the WEKA
implementation of C4.5 [26]. ARF, LazyARF, and LazyDT were implemented from
scratch.
Experimental studies were conducted using multiple benchmark datasets from the UCI
repository. All numerical attributes have been discretized in advance using Fayyad and
Irani’s method [12]. For the ensemble methods we always generated 50 models. Table 1
shows the classiﬁcation rates for the lazy methods, estimated by 10-fold cross validation
(repeated 10 times), and Table 2 the corresponding results for the regular (non-lazy)
approaches.
Interpretation of the results should be done with caution, since most diﬀerences in
classiﬁcation performance (two methods compared on a single dataset) are statistically
not signiﬁcant (at the 0.05 level of a simple t-test). Still, a closer examination of the results
and a look at the simple win/loss statistics in Table 3 gives a relatively clear picture: The
two ensemble methods are on a par and both outperform the corresponding base learner.10 The recursive partitioning procedure stops if either all examples belong to the same class or if all attributes
have already been used. As opposed to standard decision tree learning, the lazy variant does not need pruning
strategies or premature stopping conditions in order to prevent overﬁtting.
Table 1
Results of the experimental studies for the lazy learners: datasets (in brackets: number of classes, examples,
attributes) and classiﬁcation rates (in brackets: standard deviation)
Dataset LazyDT LazyARF LazyRF
Autos (7,205,25) 76.28 (9.61) 81.62 (7.97) 79.21 (8.53)
Wisconsin-breast-cancer (100) 96.11 (2.26) 96.04 (2.29) 96.35 (2.32)
Bridges-version1 (6,107,12) 52.51 (11.69) 54.77 (13.38) 54.55 (11.63)
Horse-colic (2,368,22) 78.89 (5.79) 81.85 (6.00) 80.84 (5.87)
Dermatology (6,366,34) 89.84 (4.55) 94.02 (3.80) 92.71 (3.76)
Pima-diabetes (2,768,8) 73.44 (4.49) 74.09 (4.73) 73.53 (4.76)
Ecoli (8,336,7) 79.85 (5.29) 79.68 (5.07) 80.33 (5.05)
Glass (7,214,9) 70.73 (10.47) 72.13 (10.07) 71.80 (9.97)
Haberman (2,306,3) 73.59 (4.91) 73.00 (4.90) 73.10 (3.07)
Cleveland-heart-disease (5,303,13) 76.24 (6.93) 79.71 (6.71) 79.08 (6.41)
Hungarian-heart-disease (5,294,13) 79.63 (6.83) 80.14 (6.87) 80.72 (6.58)
Hepatitis (2,155,19) 83.46 (7.49) 83.62 (8.49) 84.12 (8.19)
Iris (3,150,4) 94.00 (5.88) 94.00 (6.25) 94.00 (5.72)
Labor (2,57,16) 85.63 (13.66) 83.83 (15.79) 85.10 (14.41)
Liver-disorders (2,345,6) 56.85 (4.20) 57.03 (4.00) 57.34 (4.64)
Lymphography (4,148,18) 78.41 (9.01) 82.88 (8.31) 81.74 (8.65)
Tic-tac-toe (2,958,9) 84.01 (3.66) 92.03 (2.29) 92.15 (2.69)
Vote (2,435,16) 94.22 (3.49) 94.96 (3.04) 94.71 (3.27)
Table 2
Results of the experimental studies for the regular (non-lazy) learners: datasets (in brackets: number of classes,
examples, attributes) and classiﬁcation rates (in brackets: standard deviation)
Dataset DT ARF RF
Autos (7,205,25) 81.13 (9.20) 83.50 (8.08) 82.58 (8.07)
Wisconsin-breast-cancer (100) 94.82 (2.70) 95.61 (2.64) 95.72 (2.38)
Bridges-version1 (6,107,12) 41.95 (4.62) 50.80 (12.36) 48.02 (10.83)
Horse-colic (2,368,22) 78.32 (6.36) 78.34 (6.38) 81.49 (5.60)
Dermatology (6,366,34) 93.46 (3.58) 96.53 (3.06) 95.40 (2.98)
Pima-diabetes (2,768,8) 73.53 (4.61) 74.01 (4.65) 73.57 (4.62)
Ecoli (8,336,7) 79.86 (5.03) 80.30 (4.86) 80.12 (5.28)
Glass (7,214,9) 71.29 (10.92) 73.25 (10.10) 72.50 (10.37)
Haberman (2,306,3) 73.59 (4.91) 73.50 (4.82) 73.36 (3.43)
Cleveland-heart-disease (5,303,13) 76.33 (7.16) 80.40 (5.63) 78.55 (6.18)
Hungarian-heart-disease (5,294,13) 78.94 (6.93) 81.93 (7.40) 80.28 (6.89)
Hepatitis (2,155,19) 80.17 (8.83) 82.39 (8.31) 81.86 (9.38)
Iris (3,150,4) 93.93 (5.77) 93.47 (5.84) 93.80 (5.78)
Labor (2,57,16) 83.97 (14.61) 73.90 (13.89) 84.67 (14.28)
Liver-disorders (2,345,6) 56.85 (4.20) 57.37 (3.83) 57.54 (3.92)
Lymphography (4,148,18) 72.71 (9.61) 81.87 (8.93) 77.19 (9.03)
Tic-tac-toe (2,958,9) 85.47 (3.74) 90.63 (2.89) 93.74 (2.18)
Vote (2,435,16) 95.05 (3.23) 95.47 (2.84) 95.74 (2.91)
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we consider this as a preliminary though very promising ﬁnding that motivates a closer
examination and elaboration of this idea.
Table 3
Win/tie/loss statistics for the lazy learners (top) and the standard methods (bottom)
LazyDT LazyARF LazyRF
LazyDT 3/1/14* 2/1/15*
LazyARF 14/1/3* 9/1/8
LazyRF 15/1/2* 8/1/9
DT ARF RF
DT 3/0/15* 0/2/16*
ARF 15/0/3* 11/0/7
RF 16/0/2* 7/0/11
* Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.02 level of a Fisher sign test.
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The main contribution of this paper is a reexamination and systematic exposition of a
notion of relative information content that can decide if a probability distribution is more
or less uncertain (or spread out) than another one (or whether the two distributions are
not directly comparable). This ordering seems to be well-known in some scientiﬁc commu-
nities while being totally unknown in other ones. The surprising result is that the afore-
mentioned comparison between probability distributions comes down to comparing two
possibility distributions in the sense of their relative speciﬁcity, that is, in terms of fuzzy
set inclusion! This test seems to be natural in the sense that it exactly captures the notion
of relative peakedness of distributions, thus meeting our intuition. The fact that Shannon
entropy as well as the Gini index (and many other ones, potentially) reﬁne the peakedness
relation corroborates this intuition. It sheds light on the meaning of these indices, by lay-
ing bare a common feature for them. The peakedness ordering oﬀers a minimal robust
foundation for probabilistic information indices. Finding an extension of these results
to continuous probability distributions, using diﬀerential entropy for instance, is an obvi-
ous next task.
Our discussion also shows that there is a degree of freedom in the choice of these indi-
ces, namely in the case of two distributions that cannot be compared by the peakedness
relation but are ranked in opposite orders by, say, the entropy and the Gini index. This
point needs further study, and mathematical insight from social sciences, where axiomat-
ization results exist, might be useful in this regard. We note, however, that the situation is
the same with the speciﬁcity relation in possibility theory where several non-speciﬁcity
indices have been proposed [15,6,30,27] that disagree with each other. The same diﬃculty
can be observed in the case of belief functions [7].
The notion of peakedness is easy to understand, but, compared to entropy and other
numerical indices, it is quite weak, and its eﬃciency in probabilistic reasoning and decision
making is still unclear. In his book [25], Jeﬀ Paris advocates the use of conditional prob-
ability statements as a natural means for expressing knowledge and the maximal entropy
principle as a natural tool for selecting a reasonable default probabilistic model of this
knowledge. The above results suggest that the maximal entropy principle can be replaced
by a weaker minimal peakedness principle in problems with incompletely speciﬁed prob-
ability distributions. Of course, the minimally peaked distribution in agreement with the
constraints may fail to be unique, and the issue of choosing between them is an intriguing
384 D. Dubois, E. Hu¨llermeier / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 364–385one. Anyway, the peakedness relation can be used in all problems where the information
content of a distribution is relevant, for example in machine learning techniques a` la deci-
sion tree induction, as suggested in the previous section. These issues constitute interesting
topics of future research.Acknowledgements
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